4th Amendment
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
What Does it Mean?
The Fourth Amendment is influenced by old legal customs and aims to protect personal safety, freedom, and private property by stopping unfair searches and seizures. It says that warrants should only be issued if there's a good reason, and the warrant needs to say who or what is being searched and what's being looked for. But the Supreme Court has also decided that there can be situations where a warrant isn't needed.
4th AMENDMENT IN-DEPTH
Historical Background
The Fourth Amendment came about because of the British practice of using general warrants to search people's homes. This practice was strongly opposed, and the idea that people should be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures was a key part of English political thought. The famous saying "every man's house is his castle" reflects this belief. There were important English cases that stood up against these kinds of searches, like Semayne's Case, Entick v. Carrington, and Wilkes v. Wood.
In the American colonies, there were also concerns about unreasonable searches, especially when it came to enforcing revenue laws against smuggling. The British authorities used writs of assistance, which were like general warrants, to search homes for smuggled goods. This raised a lot of opposition, and in 1761, James Otis argued against them on the basis that they violated people's rights.
When it comes to the wording of the Fourth Amendment, there were some changes made as it went through Congress. The main idea was to protect people's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and it was tied to the proper use of warrants. However, there has been a question about whether the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment should be read together to mean that only searches that meet the requirements of the second clause (getting a warrant) are reasonable, or if there are also reasonable searches that don't need a warrant.
Overall, the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, and it has roots in both English history and the American colonial experience. It's an important protection for personal privacy and property rights.
Scope of Protected Rights
Overview of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures:
The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. When judges issue search warrants, they must have probable cause and specify what is being searched or seized. In the case of Harris v. United States, the Supreme Court approved a warrantless search of an apartment where a suspect was arrested. However, a year later, the Court changed its stance and said that law enforcement should use search warrants whenever possible when seizing items.
This approach was later modified in another case, where the Court stated that the focus should be on whether the search itself was reasonable, considering the facts and circumstances of each situation. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants in the case of Chimel v. California, highlighting that the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent arbitrary searches.
Over time, the Court's perspective evolved, and it adopted a more flexible approach to search warrants, considering the reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment aims to ensure reasonableness and only prohibits state-initiated searches and seizures that are unreasonable. The Court also considered exceptions to the warrant requirement, allowing certain searches and seizures without warrants, especially in administrative contexts where special needs exist.
While the general rule is that search warrants are necessary, the Court has recognized exceptions for incidents that involve immediate danger or emergency situations. The scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection is linked to the people it applies to, which includes U.S. citizens and aliens who have strong connections to the United States. However, the Fourth Amendment doesn't apply to searches conducted by U.S. agents on foreign soil or involving nonresident aliens.
Early Doctrine on Fourth Amendment:
To trigger the Fourth Amendment's protections, there must be a search and seizure, followed by an attempt to use the seized evidence in court. Whether a situation qualifies as a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment often depends on the individual's interest and whether the government abused it. This concept is rooted in historical cases, like Entick v. Carrington, where the idea of protecting property rights was highlighted. In this case, it was stated that any intrusion on private property, even a minor one, is considered a trespass.
The Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as safeguarding property interests has influenced its decisions. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that wiretapping wasn't covered by the Fourth Amendment because it didn't involve a physical invasion of the defendant's property. However, the Court later adjusted this view when technology advanced, acknowledging that electronic surveillance, which might involve technical trespass, could be considered a Fourth Amendment violation.
In a subsequent case, the Court reviewed convictions based on evidence obtained through wiretapping in violation of state law. The Court concluded that wiretapping didn't violate the Fourth Amendment if it didn't involve physical trespass and only involved listening, not seizing tangible items. This stance changed when Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act, which limited governmental wiretapping. The Court then ruled that wiretapping could violate the Act if officers intercepted and revealed conversation contents. This evidence was excluded from trials.
The Court applied a similar rationale to cases involving bugging premises. For instance, placing a listening device against a party wall was not considered a Fourth Amendment violation, but driving a device into a wall until it made contact with a heating duct was considered a trespass, bringing it under the Fourth Amendment. This ruling reversed the earlier stance that conversations couldn't be seized.
Overall, the Fourth Amendment's application depends on whether there's a search and seizure and how the government handles the evidence obtained. The Court's interpretation has evolved over time, considering technological advancements and the balance between property rights and government actions.
Katz and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test:
Following the cases of Olmstead v. United States and Goldman v. United States, the Court's perspective shifted in May 1967. It stated that the Fourth Amendment's primary goal is protecting privacy, not just property interests. This marked a departure from the earlier idea that property rights controlled government search and seizure rights. Then, in December 1967, the Court overruled Olmstead and Goldman, eliminating the need for physical trespass to invoke the Fourth Amendment's protections. This change meant that electronic surveillance also fell under the Amendment's requirements.
The test introduced in Katz v. United States focused on people's reasonable expectations of privacy. The Court explained that if something is willingly exposed to the public, even in private spaces like homes or offices, it's not protected by the Fourth Amendment. However, if someone seeks to keep something private, even in areas accessible to the public, it may be constitutionally protected. Essentially, the question was whether there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion.
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court emphasized Katz's privacy emphasis. It ruled that using thermal imaging devices to gather information from inside a home without a warrant was considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court's concern was about technology shrinking privacy, and it stated that using technology to gain information that couldn't have been obtained otherwise, without physically invading a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search.
While the Court reaffirmed the importance of protecting the home, privacy protection in other contexts became more complex. A two-part test emerged, focusing on both subjective and objective expectations of privacy. However, the subjective element became less significant as the Court recognized that privacy expectations are influenced by laws and societal norms.
The Court aimed to balance law enforcement needs with privacy interests. This led to a sliding-scale approach, where different levels of privacy were evaluated, and warrants were required if the invasion was significant. Exceptions to the warrant requirement expanded, allowing more police authority. The case of Berger v. New York confirmed that wiretapping is a search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment, requiring probable cause and specific warrant descriptions.
In essence, the Court's perspective shifted from focusing solely on property interests to prioritizing privacy, which affected how the Fourth Amendment was applied in various situations.
Current Doctrine on Searches and Seizures:
In the case of United States v. Jones, the Court focused on whether placing a GPS device on a suspect's car and tracking it for a month was a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches. Even though the Court unanimously agreed that this tracking violated the suspect's rights, there was disagreement about the reasons behind the decision. Most of the Court relied on the concept of common law trespass, stating that attaching the GPS device to the car was a physical intrusion into the suspect's private property.
However, some Justices had a different perspective. They suggested that long-term GPS tracking could invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, even without a physical intrusion. They believed that collecting a month's worth of personal data could create a detailed picture of an individual's life, violating their privacy rights.
In a later case called Carpenter v. United States, the Court confirmed that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with protecting people's reasonable expectation of privacy, whether or not a physical trespass is involved. In this case, the Court ruled that the government needed a warrant to access seven days of cell-site location information, which tracks the location of a cell phone. The Court noted that historical cell-site records raise even greater privacy concerns than the GPS tracking in the Jones case. Despite previous cases where the Court didn't extend Fourth Amendment protection to information shared with third parties, like wireless carriers, they decided that cell-site records are different and deserve protection due to their sensitive nature.
Open Fields Doctrine:
In the case of Hester v. United States, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment doesn't protect open fields, like pastures, wooded areas, vacant lots, and open water. This means that police searches in these areas don't have to follow the usual requirements of getting warrants and showing probable cause. While the Katz v. United States case raised questions about this open fields principle, those questions were resolved in the Oliver v. United States case.
In the Oliver case, the Court emphasized that the open fields exception still stands. It pointed out that open fields aren't considered "effects" under the Fourth Amendment's wording. The Court clarified that this exception applies to fenced and posted fields as well. The ruling stated that people can't expect privacy for activities done outside in fields, except in the area right around their home. It also mentioned that activities conducted in visible outbuildings can't be considered private from trespassers peeking in from the outside.
Even if someone puts up a tall fence to screen their property, they can't expect privacy from aerial inspections by aircraft flying at navigable heights. Helicopters flying lower also don't violate privacy expectations. The Court added that taking aerial photos of commercial facilities that can be seen from public areas on the ground is allowed, as these spaces are more like open fields than private areas around a dwelling.
Seizure of Property
Inspections:
In the past, some early cases suggested that the Fourth Amendment only applied when searches were done for criminal investigation purposes. The Supreme Court initially used a "reasonableness" test for such searches, not always requiring warrants or probable cause. But in 1967, the Court ruled in Camara v. Municipal Court and See v. City of Seattle that administrative inspections meant to find building code violations needed warrants if the person being inspected objected. The Court said that the Fourth Amendment interests in these inspection cases were significant, even though the searches were not criminal in nature.
However, in 1970 and 1972, the Court ruled that some administrative inspections related to alcohol and firearms regulations were exceptions and didn't need warrants based on statutes. This was different from the previous rulings about building code inspections.
Later, in 1978, in the Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. case, the Court reaffirmed the importance of warrants for administrative inspections. It stated that even though the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) authorized federal inspectors to check work areas for safety issues without warrants, this violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court believed that Congress had gone too far in allowing inspections without proper warrants.
The Donovan v. Dewey case further clarified this by saying that some governmental inspections of commercial property without warrants could be allowed under specific circumstances. This was based on the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (FMSHA) and its requirements for safety inspections in mines. The Court explained that commercial properties had a different expectation of privacy compared to homes, and this could be protected through regulatory schemes.
However, the Court's stance on inspections varied depending on the context. For example, in City of Los Angeles v. Patel in 2015, the Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance allowing police to inspect hotel registration records without warning. The Court ruled that hotel owners should have a chance to contest these searches before facing penalties.
In some situations, the Court recognized that "special needs" beyond regular law enforcement could justify exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements. This applied to things like urinalysis drug testing in the railroad industry, which was regulated extensively.
The Court has made distinctions between different types of inspections, like random automobile stops versus inventorying valuables and firearms. It has generally upheld the idea that certain exceptions can exist, like when vehicles are impounded or when there's an immediate concern for public safety.
However, in Caniglia v. Strom, the Court decided not to expand these exceptions beyond vehicles. In this case, the Court ruled that a warrantless search of a home conducted under the idea of "community caretaking" wasn't allowed, emphasizing that homes have different protections compared to vehicles under the Fourth Amendment.
Property Subject to Seizure:
While search warrants have traditionally been issued to seize illegal items and items related to crimes, a 1921 case called Gouled v. United States set limits on what could be seized. In that case, the Court unanimously ruled that property subject to seizure should be limited to contraband, things used to commit crimes, and items that show evidence of crimes. The Court decided that seizing things like papers just to use them as evidence in a trial was not allowed. Although papers weren't considered specially protected, their role as evidence made them immune from seizure.
However, in 1967, the Court changed this rule in the Warden v. Hayden case. It is now established that certain types of evidence like fingerprints, blood, urine samples, and even conversations can be obtained through the warrant process or without a warrant if there's a special need for the government to do so. Nonetheless, the Court has also ruled that some medically assisted bodily intrusions are not allowed, such as forcing someone to vomit or performing surgery to retrieve evidence. When deciding if medical tests and procedures are reasonable, the Court considers factors like their impact on the person's safety and privacy, as well as their importance to the case being prosecuted.
Property Seizures and Self-Incrimination Protections:
The Supreme Court has made a distinction between the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination. While there appeared to be some connection between these protections in a past case called Boyd v. United States in 1886, the modern interpretation sees them as addressing separate issues.
In Boyd, the case involved a situation where the government alleged that certain goods were imported illegally and subject to forfeiture. The Court looked at how both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments applied. In this case, the Court found a problem with the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. Justice Joseph Bradley, who wrote for the majority of the Court, also considered the Fourth Amendment. He noted that while the statute in question didn't directly authorize a search, it forced the defendant to produce documents, which he argued was within the bounds of the Search and Seizure Clause. He referred to a historical legal opinion that supported the idea that seizing items solely for use as evidence was not allowed. Justice Bradley emphasized that the essence of the government's wrongdoing against Boyd was not just the physical intrusion but the violation of his personal security, liberty, and property. He pointed out that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were closely related in this context.
However, the Court's modern approach doesn't focus on merging the two amendments. In Warden v. Hayden, the Court explained that the items seized were not of a "testimonial" or "communicative" nature, so their introduction didn't force the defendant to testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This case clarified that not all items have the same implications when it comes to self-incrimination.
Later, in Andresen v. Maryland, police searched the defendant's offices for specific documents related to a fraudulent land sale. The Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment didn't apply because the defendant hadn't been compelled to produce or authenticate the documents. As for the Fourth Amendment, the Court determined that since the seized business records were evidence of criminal activity, they could be taken based on the Warden v. Hayden precedent. The Court acknowledged the potential privacy concerns in executing a warrant to search for someone's papers and stressed the importance of minimizing unnecessary invasions of privacy.
It's important to note that while Andresen dealt with business records, it's unclear if the same principles would apply to personal papers like diaries and letters, which have a stronger privacy interest.
Unreasonable Seizures of Persons
The Fourth Amendment has been established to safeguard against unreasonable searches and arrests. Chief Justice John Marshall and subsequent legal decisions have recognized that the Fourth Amendment also protects against arbitrary arrests. In situations where someone is detained, even briefly, certain criteria must be met to ensure the seizure is justified.
Historically, warrantless arrests were allowed for individuals who had committed a breach of the peace or a felony. The Fourth Amendment permits arrests in public places if there is probable cause, regardless of whether a warrant is obtained. The determination of probable cause for warrantless arrests is based on the totality of the circumstances leading up to the arrest.
Seizures of individuals, even those that aren't formal arrests, also fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment. A valid reason must be presented to justify these seizures, and the level of justification required depends on the nature of the detention – either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
The Fourth Amendment doesn't mandate officers to choose issuing a citation over making an arrest for minor offenses, like traffic violations. In the case of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court ruled that such decisions are left to police discretion, avoiding constitutional review.
While arrests were rarely contested in the Supreme Court until recently, the expansion of exclusionary rules applied to states led to more litigation. Evidence obtained as a result of unlawful seizures can be excluded, including verbal evidence like confessions and admissions, as well as physical evidence such as fingerprints. The Fourth Amendment also prohibits malicious prosecution, where actions lead to a seizure without probable cause. In Thompson v. Clark, it was determined that malicious prosecution can be seen as a Fourth Amendment seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the underlying criminal case against the person ends favorably. This standard doesn't require a direct indication of the person's innocence.
Probable Cause
Overview of Probable Cause:
Establishing probable cause through information from informants has led to divided opinions within the Court. A key case, Draper v. United States, involved a reliable informant who described the defendant's appearance and bag contents, leading to an arrest. The Court determined that corroboration of some parts of the tip validated the arrest.
Jones v. United States dealt with a search warrant and assessed whether the tip and corroborating info together established probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas established criteria for informant affidavits: the basis of the informant's knowledge and the informant's credibility. Spinelli v. United States applied this, separating evaluation of the tip and corroborating info. The Court later endorsed the "totality of the circumstances" approach in United States v. Harris, where an informer's tip and additional evidence were used for a search warrant.
In Illinois v. Gates, the Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Justice William Rehnquist stated that an informant's reliability and knowledge basis shouldn't be viewed separately. The new approach considers all circumstances, aiming to decide if there's a reasonable chance of finding evidence or contraband in a specific place. The issuing magistrate's task is a practical, commonsense decision based on the available affidavit details.
Probable Cause Doctrine:
There has been a lot of legal debate about how much information is needed in a complaint to establish probable cause. Simply making general claims is not sufficient. However, in the case of United States v. Ventresca, an affidavit provided by a law enforcement officer was deemed enough to establish probable cause. The affidavit explained the officer's belief that an illegal distillery was operating in a specific location. This belief was supported by the officer's own observations and those of fellow investigators, which were described in detail in the affidavit. The Court held that including some of these underlying details in the affidavit is important. When these circumstances are laid out and the source of information is credible, and a magistrate agrees that probable cause exists, the process of obtaining a warrant should not be hindered by requiring an overly strict showing of evidence.
Non-Traditional Contexts and Probable Cause:
When the process of obtaining a warrant is used to allow the seizure of books and other items that might be protected by the First Amendment, the Court has required stricter standards compared to other cases. Seizing materials that could be protected by the First Amendment is considered a form of prior restraint, and strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment is necessary. At the very least, a warrant is needed, and for larger seizures, additional safeguards might be necessary. For instance, in Marcus v. Search Warrant, the seizure of 11,000 copies of 280 publications using a warrant issued by a magistrate who hadn't examined the publications but relied on a police officer's vague affidavit was considered invalid. The lack of careful examination of the materials and the failure to specify the items to be seized were seen as inadequate. Moreover, the police didn't have clear guidelines for discretion, as there were no steps in the procedure before the seizure that focused on obscenity. Even a state procedure designed to comply with Marcus by having the magistrate examine copies of books before issuing a warrant was deemed insufficient, since the warrant allowed the sheriff to seize all copies of the specified titles, and the person involved wasn't given a hearing on the obscenity question before the warrant was issued.
However, there is still confusion regarding the necessity and nature of hearings to address the issue of obscenity before a seizure. In a later case, the Court concluded that as long as there are appropriate safeguards, there is no need for a pre-seizure adversary hearing on obscenity if the film is seized to preserve a copy for evidence rather than for destruction as contraband. It's constitutionally acceptable to seize a film with a warrant, but a prompt post-seizure adversary hearing on the obscenity issue is required. Until obscenity is judicially determined, the film can continue to be shown. If no other copy is available, a copy must either be made from the seized film or the film must be returned.
Seizing a film without a constitutionally valid warrant is not allowed; it can't be justified as incidental to an arrest, and the determination of obscenity can't be made solely by the officer. A warrant must be supported by specific facts in affidavits so that the issuing magistrate can closely examine the question of obscenity. However, this doesn't mean that a higher standard of probable cause is needed for obtaining a warrant to seize First Amendment-protected materials. The reference to a "higher hurdle . . . of reasonableness" in a previous decision wasn't meant to establish a higher standard of probable cause for such warrants, but rather to emphasize the requirement that police obtain a warrant from a magistrate rather than relying on the "exigency" exception.
In Stanford v. Texas, a seizure of over 2,000 books, pamphlets, and documents was invalidated due to a warrant that broadly allowed the seizure of written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas. The Court emphasized that when the "things" to be seized are books and their seizure is based on the ideas they contain, the requirement that warrants describe the "things to be seized" must be exact and meticulous. This is essential to remain faithful to First Amendment freedoms.
Nevertheless, the First Amendment does not prevent the issuance or execution of a warrant to search a newsroom for photographs of demonstrators who had harmed policemen. However, the Court hinted that magistrates asked to issue such warrants should ensure that the search doesn't overly interfere with press freedoms by setting limits on the type, scope, and intrusiveness of the search.
Warrant Requirement
Overview:
Highlighting the importance of warrants involves having a neutral judge decide between law enforcement and citizens' privacy. This ensures that privacy can only be invaded with a strong reason, called probable cause, and this invasion is controlled by specifying who is to be taken, where the search happens, and what evidence is sought. While a warrant is issued without the subject's input, its validity can be challenged later in a hearing if evidence is found and a prosecution takes place.
Neutral and Detached Magistrate:
In many instances, the Court has emphasized the importance of having warrants issued by a judicial officer or magistrate. The key idea of the Fourth Amendment, which some eager officers might not fully understand, is that it doesn't deny law enforcement the use of reasonable deductions from evidence. Instead, it insists that these deductions be made by a neutral and unbiased magistrate, not by an officer actively searching for evidence. Assuming that evidence strong enough for a magistrate to issue a search warrant would also justify officers searching without a warrant would make the Amendment ineffective, leaving people's homes secure only based on the judgment of police officers.
These cases don't necessarily mean that only a judge or a legal professional can issue warrants, but they establish two criteria for the issuing party's authority. First, they must be impartial and detached, and second, they must be capable of deciding whether there's enough reason for the requested arrest or search. The first requirement isn't met when the issuing party is involved in law enforcement activities themselves, but the Court hasn't insisted on the same level of independence and guaranteed salary that federal judges have. Regarding the second requirement, the Court has mostly taken a practical approach in determining if the issuing party has the ability to decide if there's probable cause.
Probable Cause Requirement:
The idea of probable cause is at the heart of the Warrant Clause. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor the relevant federal laws actually define probable cause; its definition comes from court decisions. When someone applies for a warrant, they must provide the magistrate with enough facts so the officer can decide if there's probable cause. To figure out if there's probable cause, we're only interested in whether, at the time of the affidavit, the person making the statement had reasonable grounds to believe that a law was being broken on the premises to be searched. If the facts in the statement would make a sensible and cautious person think that a crime had occurred, then there's probable cause and a warrant can be issued.
Probable cause is determined based on practical and real-life considerations, not just legal technicalities. The law supports the use of warrants, and their use shouldn't be blocked by overly strict interpretations of the supporting information in the statement and testimony. Similarly, the evidence that's less legally solid than what would justify an officer acting on their own without a warrant can still be accepted by courts. Courts will uphold the decision of probable cause as long as the magistrate had a good enough reason to believe that there was probable cause.
Particularity Requirement:
The rule that warrants must clearly describe what's to be seized ensures that searches can't be too broad and that officers can't take something different from what's specified in the warrant. The executing officers are bound by what's written in the warrant and can't use their own judgment to decide what to take. This rule also restricts the areas that can be searched to places where the specified object could reasonably be located.
The purpose of this specific description requirement goes beyond preventing broad searches. It also serves to inform the person whose property is being searched about the authorized actions of the officer and the limits on their search power. Because of this, the warrant itself has to accurately detail the items to be seized, or the specifics must be included in related documents mentioned in the warrant and actually shown to the person whose property is being searched.
Knock and Announce Rule:
The Fourth Amendment is guided by the principle of reasonableness when it comes to executing search warrants. For a while, rules about how warrants were carried out were often determined by laws and regulations. Traditionally, common law required officers to announce their presence and purpose before entering a property, unless certain circumstances applied. This rule was codified in federal law and most states.
In a case called Ker v. California, the Court discussed the requirement of announcing before entry as a constitutional aspect, although some situations might justify entry without prior announcement.
Later, in Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court established that the common law rule of knocking and announcing is a part of the Fourth Amendment's concept of reasonableness. However, this rule has exceptions when there's a risk of violence, an escaped prisoner taking refuge, or evidence destruction. The test, as explained in Richards v. Wisconsin, is whether, under specific circumstances, knocking and announcing could be dangerous, futile, or impede the investigation. The Court ruled that no blanket exception exists for drug-related search warrants; each situation should be evaluated to decide if a no-knock entry is necessary.
If officers decide to knock and announce before searching for drugs, they might still be allowed to forcibly enter if there's no quick response. Recent federal laws permitting no-knock entries in specific circumstances will likely lead the Court to further explore the rules around announcement.
A law regulating the expiration of a warrant and issuing a new one should favor the individual. Similarly, just as new facts must establish probable cause, executing the warrant should be done promptly to maintain probable cause as much as possible.
Other Considerations When Executing a Warrant:
When executing a warrant, police actions must align with the purpose of the authorized intrusion, especially considering that the Fourth Amendment strongly safeguards home privacy. If police bring media or third parties into a home during warrant execution without aiding the process, it's seen as a violation of the Amendment.
When officers have a search warrant for specific premises and individuals, they can't automatically search other people present. They can conduct a patdown if safety is a concern, but a detailed search requires specific probable cause related to that person. However, in Michigan v. Summers, the Court allowed detaining the owner or occupant encountered on the premises' front porch during a search. This detention, less intrusive than an arrest, serves law enforcement interests. Similar reasoning permits reasonable force for detention and searching premises under a reasonable but mistaken belief that they're described in a valid warrant.
Detention limits during a search were discussed in Bailey v. United States. The Court decided that detentions, like in Summers, depend on spatial proximity to the search area, not just timing. This ensures the rule's scope aligns with its reason.
Although search and arrest warrants are similar in many aspects, a significant difference is that a valid arrest warrant can't authorize entry into a third party's home to find the named person. For that, a search warrant, issued by a magistrate based on probable cause, is necessary.
Exceptions to Warrant Requirement
Overview:
While the Supreme Court emphasizes the significance of using warrants and describes searches without warrants as exceptional cases, it seems that a larger number of searches and arrests actually occur without warrants. The American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure acknowledges that, practically speaking, searches without warrants, often incident to arrests, have been more prevalent and important than searches with warrants. Particularly in matters related to narcotics and gambling laws, searches with warrants have played a smaller role in law enforcement.
However, the Court consistently asserts a fundamental constitutional principle: searches conducted without prior approval from a judge or magistrate are inherently considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless specific exceptions apply. These exceptions are carefully defined and established, and those seeking to claim exemption must demonstrate that the situation demanded such action. While there's an attempt to categorize these exceptions, their number and scope have been expanding over time.
Consent Searches:
Just like other rights in the Constitution, Fourth Amendment rights can be waived, meaning a person can agree to a search of their belongings or property even if law enforcement hasn't followed the Amendment's rules. The Court emphasizes that it's the prosecution's responsibility to prove that the consent was given willingly and with an understanding of the choice. Courts must look at the entire situation to decide if the consent was freely given or coerced.
It's not necessary for individuals to be informed of their right to refuse consent for a search to be considered voluntary, so police don't have to give a version of Miranda warnings specific to the Fourth Amendment. However, if officers use their authority to pressure someone into consenting, that consent won't be seen as voluntary. If a search is allowed based on the deception of an undercover officer or an informant, it's usually considered valid.
Issues arise when determining if consent from a third party is valid. Previously, if a third party had control over the place or items to be searched, their consent was sufficient. Now, it's enough if the officer believed, even if mistakenly, that the third party had the authority to consent. If one person agrees to a search of a shared place but another present person objects, the search is generally considered unreasonable. This determination is influenced by common social expectations. If the objecting person leaves without any plan to return soon, the expectations might change.
Exigent Circumstances and Warrants:
The Court acknowledges that certain urgent situations can be exceptions to the need for a warrant, making a warrantless search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. These "exigent circumstances" depend on each specific case. Different scenarios can qualify as exigencies, like searching after an arrest, providing emergency help, chasing a suspect, and stopping evidence destruction. In cases without immediate danger, warrantless searches are allowed when there's a strong need for official action and no time for a warrant.
The Court doesn't use a fixed rule for identifying exigent circumstances. Instead, it examines each situation individually, considering all facts. When officers provide emergency aid, they need a valid reason to believe someone in the home urgently needs help. If officers didn't create the emergency themselves, they can enter without a warrant to prevent evidence destruction. However, in Johnson v. United States, the Court rejected the idea that a smell justified a warrantless search.
When officers are pursuing a suspect, the Court acknowledges that quick action is crucial and intrusion is smaller. For example, officers aren't required to wait if their safety or others' is at risk. In Lange v. California, the Court emphasized that the exigent circumstances exception is case-specific and refused to say that chasing a misdemeanor suspect always justifies a warrantless search.
Warrantless Searches Dependent on Probable Cause
Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine:
The Court has found that searches following arrests can happen without a warrant in certain situations. The common-law rule allowing searches of arrestees' persons has been generally accepted, and even searches connected to lawful but not unconstitutional arrests have been upheld. The focus has been on the extent of the search, particularly its connection to the arrest's circumstances. Searches are meant to prevent evidence destruction and access to weapons.
The Court has moved from case-by-case evaluations to categorical assessments for post-arrest searches. For instance, in Riley v. California, the Court refused to apply United States v. Robinson's scope to digital data searches in cell phones found during arrests. They concluded that searching cell phones requires a warrant due to privacy concerns. Similarly, in Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Court examined compulsory breath and blood tests post-arrest for suspected drunk driving. Breath tests were seen as less invasive and were generally permissible without a warrant, while blood tests were seen as more intrusive and generally required a warrant.
The scope of the search incident to arrest has sparked disagreements, especially regarding areas beyond the person, like their premises or vehicle. In Chimel v. California, the Court established that a search incident to arrest must be confined to the immediate area where the person can gain access to weapons or evidence. However, searches of other rooms or closed areas need a warrant. This principle has been upheld in some contexts but not all. The Court later introduced exceptions like protective sweeps in situations where third parties could pose a threat.
New York v. Belton expanded searches to vehicles incident to arrest, allowing searches of the passenger compartment and containers within it if connected to a recent occupant's arrest. This understanding of Belton was later clarified in Arizona v. Gant, stating that vehicle searches could only happen when the arrestee can reach the passenger compartment during the search or if there's evidence related to the arrest offense inside the vehicle.
Vehicle Searches:
In the early days of cars, the Court made a rule that vehicles can be searched without a warrant if the searching officer has a good reason to believe the vehicle has illegal stuff. The reason for this is that vehicles can quickly move away if time is taken to get a warrant.
At first, the Court said that parked cars couldn't be taken just because they're movable, and cars can only be stopped while moving or shortly after stopping. They also said that the search must happen around the time of the stop, and not later at the police station.
Later, the Court introduced another reason for allowing vehicle searches without warrants. They said that cars have less privacy because they're used for travel and not for living or storing personal things. This means people have less of a private expectation in their cars.
However, there's a limit to this exception. Police can't enter a home or its surroundings to search a vehicle without a warrant. The search's scope is limited to the vehicle itself. To search a vehicle like this, the officer needs a proper reason to access it. Usually, officers can't go into a home or its surroundings without permission or a warrant.
Though the reduced privacy idea has given police more power to search vehicles without warrants, they still need a good reason to search a car, and they can't stop vehicles randomly. They need a valid reason or suspicion to stop a vehicle based on a traffic or safety problem or some crime. If a car is stopped, both the driver and passengers are considered to be under arrest and can challenge the legality of the stop.
If a car is stopped, the officer can pat down the driver and passengers if there's a reasonable suspicion they're dangerous and armed. If there's a strong belief that weapons might be there, the officer can also do a protective search of parts of the car where a weapon might be hidden. If there's a reasonable suspicion about contraband or suspicious items inside the car, police can take it.
If police have a good reason to believe there's something illegal in a vehicle, they can take it to the police station for a search without a warrant. This is allowed because vehicles are less private, and the need for the search doesn't disappear after the car is stopped.
Police can also do an inventory search of impounded cars to protect public safety and the owner's property. Any evidence of a crime found during these searches can be used in court.
When searching a car without a warrant, police can't search the passengers without a good reason to believe they're armed and dangerous. Otherwise, a pat-down search might be allowed if the passengers are suspected of being dangerous, or if there's suspicion of criminal activity.
The interior of a car doesn't have a high expectation of privacy, so searching spaces like the glove compartment or under the seats doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment. Luggage and closed containers found in cars can also be searched without a warrant if there's a good reason to suspect illegal stuff, whether they belong to the driver or passengers. This rule applies whether police have a reason to search just the containers or the car for something that can fit in the containers.
Plain View Doctrine:
A similar idea is the rule that if an officer can see something clearly without needing to search, they can take it without a warrant. Or, if an officer needs a warrant to search but they can see something that gives them a reason to search, then that can be used as a reason for the search.
But this rule has limits. Officers must have a good reason to believe that what they see is illegal before they can take it. For example, if they see something that looks like it shouldn't be there, they might need a warrant or a good reason to search and take it.
The Court has compared this idea to a plain view doctrine. This means that once officers have seen something illegal, the owner's privacy right to that thing is lost. So, officers can seal up a container again, follow where it goes in a controlled situation, and take it without a warrant.
Warrantless Searches Not Dependent on Probable Cause
Terry Stop and Frisk Doctrine and Practice:
Courts have followed the common law and allowed police officers to arrest someone without a warrant if they have good reason to believe the person committed a felony or a misdemeanor in their presence. This reason needs to exist before the arrest and can't be made up later.
In a case called Terry v. Ohio, the Court approved a situation where a police officer patted down a person for weapons based on suspicious behavior. The Court said that if a police officer stops someone and limits their freedom to walk away, they need to have a good reason for doing so. This reason is based on specific facts that make the officer believe criminal behavior might be happening.
Over time, the standard for stops without a warrant has become one of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This means that police officers can stop and question someone if they have a reasonable suspicion that the person might be involved in a crime.
The Court has also discussed when a person is considered "seized" under the Fourth Amendment. A person is considered seized when an officer uses force or shows authority to stop their movement. This has been applied in situations where someone is chased by the police or shot at by the police. The Court clarified that using physical force with the intent to stop someone is a seizure, even if the person doesn't actually stop. In a recent case, the Court said that if the police use force with the intention to stop someone, even if they temporarily escape, they are considered seized.
Terry Stop and Frisk and Vehicles:
A Terry search doesn't only apply to a stop and frisk of a person; it can also involve a protective search of the inside of a car if an officer has a reasonable belief that the person might be dangerous and could quickly access weapons. The length of time a Terry detention can last depends on the situation. For example, a twenty-minute detention of a driver who evaded drug agents and needed to be held until they arrived was considered appropriate, as long as the police were actively investigating during that time.
Similar rules apply to detaining luggage at airports to check for drugs. If an officer reasonably believes that a traveler's luggage might contain narcotics, they can briefly detain the luggage to investigate further, as long as the investigation is limited in scope. This can even include using a trained dog to sniff the luggage for narcotics. However, if a suspect is taken to an interrogation room without enough reason and their luggage is retrieved without their permission, it can taint any consent to search the luggage.
Different rules seem to apply to border searches of international travelers. The Court has allowed a twenty-four hour detention of a traveler suspected of smuggling drugs internally.
Special Needs Doctrine
Overview of Border Searches:
Congress has the power to regulate people or things coming into the United States. This power comes from its authority to control foreign trade and protect the country's borders. Since the First Congress, customs searches at the border don't need a warrant, strong suspicion, or even a certain level of suspicion that comes with investigative stops. The Supreme Court has said that searches at the international border are important to stop smuggling and keep prohibited items out.
Although there's this broad authority to search people and things at the border, the Fourth Amendment has some limits. Generally, the Fourth Amendment says a government officer needs a warrant based on good reason before they can search or take something. However, because the key factor of the Fourth Amendment is what's reasonable, courts have recognized some situations where the government can do a search or seizure without a warrant.
Searches at International Borders:
According to the border search exception of the Fourth Amendment, federal officers can generally search people and things entering the United States without needing a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or strong evidence of wrongdoing. The Supreme Court has stated that searches at the border are reasonable because the government has the right to protect itself by checking people and things coming into the country. This is because these searches happen at the border, and this fact alone makes them reasonable.
The Court has mentioned that there's less privacy expectation at the border, meaning that the government's interests are considered more important than individual privacy rights. While these searches can happen at any part of the international border, they can also occur at places that are like the border, such as international airports and post offices receiving international mail.
When deciding if a border search or detention is reasonable, courts usually differentiate between routine and nonroutine searches and seizures. Nonroutine searches require a higher level of suspicion of illegal activity. Nonroutine searches are those that go beyond basic checks, like extended detentions, strip searches, body cavity searches, and involuntary x-ray searches.
In a case called United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court ruled that detaining an airline traveler from Colombia for sixteen hours didn't violate the Fourth Amendment, even though it went beyond a regular customs inspection. This was because there was a reasonable suspicion that she was smuggling illegal things. The Court also said that a longer detention resulting from a border search might be okay if it's related to the initial reasons for the detention.
In another case, United States v. Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court said that federal officers can search vehicles at the border without a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or strong evidence, even to the extent of taking apart and putting back together the fuel tank. However, the Court noted that there might be times when a vehicle search at the border could be seen as unreasonable due to the way it's carried out.
Searches Beyond the Border:
Under the border search exception, federal officers can generally perform routine searches of people and items coming into the United States without needing a warrant, reasonable suspicion, or strong evidence of illegal activity. However, stops and searches that happen farther away from the border might need a higher level of suspicion or evidence of illegal activity to be considered acceptable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the limits of the Fourth Amendment on patrols near the border. In a case called Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, the Court ruled that a warrantless stop and search of a car about twenty miles from the border violated the Fourth Amendment because the Border Patrol officers didn't have enough evidence to believe that the car had people in the country unlawfully. While the government can do routine inspections and searches at the border without a warrant or individual suspicion, the Court decided that searching vehicles away from the physical border is different because people have more protection under the Fourth Amendment within the United States.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court looked at whether random patrol stops to question drivers about their immigration status or any suspicious behavior are constitutionally allowed. The Court said that these random patrol stops must have specific facts that reasonably make the officers think the car has people in the country unlawfully. The Court thought that random stops without suspicion could interfere too much with people's use of highways near the border, so they needed reasonable suspicion. In a case where officers stopped a car near the border based only on the Mexican heritage of the people in the car, the Court ruled that this wasn't enough for reasonable suspicion.
Using the reasonable suspicion test from Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Cortez that there was reasonable suspicion for a stop near the border because the agents had found clues of illegal immigration in that area before and knew where suspects might show up. In United States v. Arvizu, the Court ruled that a Border Patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop a van with more than 100 pounds of illegal items based on the location of the van and observations of the people inside. All these signs made it reasonably likely there was illegal activity.
The Supreme Court also looked at vehicle stops at fixed immigration checkpoints. These are points on major highways near the border where officers can briefly stop and question drivers, even without suspecting that the car has people in the country unlawfully. The Court decided in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte that these checkpoint stops are okay because they're regular and drivers can expect them.
However, there are limits on what Border Patrol agents can do at these checkpoints. In United States v. Ortiz, the Supreme Court ruled that at checkpoints away from the border, officers can't search private vehicles without permission or strong evidence of illegal activity. The Court said that even though these stops are routine, a search is invasive and can't be done without good reason. The Court decided that Border Patrol agents wrongly searched a car at a checkpoint because they didn't have enough evidence to believe it had people in the country unlawfully.
The Supreme Court also looked at whether warrantless stops and checks of vessels in inland U.S. waters, not at the border, are constitutional. In a case called United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the Court said that government officers can board vessels in inland waters that have easy access to the open sea to do routine document checks without suspecting criminal activity. The Court thought that since there's a strong reason to make sure vessels follow the rules, especially in places with lots of drug trafficking, and stopping all vessels at specific checkpoints would be too hard, these checks are allowed.
Drug Testing:
In 1989, the Supreme Court made two decisions that said certain classes of railroad and public employees could be drug tested without needing a warrant, probable cause, or even individual suspicion of wrongdoing. They said these tests were okay because there were special needs beyond just regular law enforcement that justified them.
In a case called Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the Court said it was okay for railroads to do blood, urine, and breath tests on employees involved in train accidents or breaking safety rules. They thought it was important to test these employees without needing individual suspicion because if someone using drugs operated a train, it could lead to a big accident before anyone noticed. The Court also said that even though the tests were a bit invasive, they were necessary because safety in the train industry is heavily regulated. Another case, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, said it was okay for the Customs Service to test employees looking for a job transfer or promotion to positions that dealt with drug interdiction or carrying firearms. The Court said this was necessary to make sure these employees weren't impaired by drugs while using a firearm.
The Court looked at public schools too. In Vernonia School District v. Acton, they said it was okay for a school to randomly test students in sports teams for drugs. The Court thought this was important to prevent drug use among students in sports, and they said students in sports have less privacy because they're used to physical exams and less privacy in locker rooms. The Court also said that since schools have power over students like a guardian, it's important to stop drug use among students.
The Court later extended this to students in extracurricular activities in Board of Education v. Earls. They said it was okay for a school to test all junior high and high school students in these activities. They said this was needed because there was a nationwide drug problem, even though there wasn't much evidence of a problem in this school. They also said that since these students could choose not to do these activities, it was okay to test them.
But in other cases, the Court said there were no special reasons to allow random testing. For example, they said Georgia couldn't make candidates for state office take drug tests because there wasn't any real fear of drug use among state officials. They also said a hospital's drug screening program for pregnant patients suspected of using drugs was not okay because it was collecting evidence for law enforcement, which went against the Fourth Amendment's rules.
Overall, the Court allowed drug testing in certain situations where there were special needs beyond regular law enforcement, but they also said there are limits to when random testing can happen.
National Security:
In a case called Katz v. United States, Justice Byron White suggested that in national security situations, electronic surveillance authorized by the President or the Attorney General might be allowed without getting approval from a court first. The Executive Branch argued that it could tap phones and use bugs in two types of national security cases: against domestic subversion and foreign intelligence operations. First, they said it was the President's inherent power, and then they argued that this kind of surveillance was like a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court unanimously decided that for domestic subversion cases, they needed to follow the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements. They said that usually, a search was reasonable only if it followed the rules of a warrant. The government's need to protect national security couldn't just override the rule that they have to show evidence to a neutral judge before invading people's privacy. This rule was even more important in national security cases because the government might see its opponents as threats and target them, which could violate the First Amendment as well as the Fourth. The Court also said that the argument that courts couldn't handle national security cases or keep them secret wasn't valid.
The question of how much power the President has in these situations is still debated in court. Congress has also acted by creating a special court to decide if warrants are needed for electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence cases. The President can also allow surveillance without a warrant to get foreign intelligence, but only if the communication is between foreign powers and there's almost no chance that any person in the United States will be heard.
School Searches:
In a case called New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court explained how searches by public school officials should be handled. Even though students are in school, the Fourth Amendment still applies to their searches by school officials. This is because school officials act like representatives of the State, not just like parents. But because schools are different from other places, the rules for searches are a bit relaxed. The Court said that school searches don't always need a warrant or the same level of proof called probable cause. Instead, a simple rule of being reasonable is what guides school searches of students' things and their bodies. This means there must be a good reason to think that the search will find evidence that the student broke a school rule or even the law. The search should also match the situation and not be too intrusive considering the student's age, sex, and what they're suspected of doing.
For example, in the case Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, a student had pills that they said came from another student, Savana Redding. The Court found that there was enough reason to think Savana might be involved, so they checked her backpack and her clothes. However, the school officials went too far by making Savana take off her clothes until she was in her underwear and by even making her pull out her bra and underwear elastic. The Court thought this was like a strip search, which was too much. They said that because Savana wasn't a danger and there was no reason to think the pills were in her underwear, the search was too intrusive and broke the Fourth Amendment's rules. Even though the Court said the search was wrong, they also said the school officials who did it couldn't be punished because the law wasn't clear before that this kind of search was not allowed.
Searches of Prisoners, Parolees, and Probationers:
When it comes to jails and prisons, the Court says that we should trust the judgment of the people in charge unless there's good evidence their rules are unnecessary or unfair. In a case called Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Court said it's okay to do routine strip searches, even very thorough ones, on people who are newly arrested and brought in, even if they were arrested for minor things. The jail officials gave good reasons for this, like making sure there are no infections, pests, or banned things coming in, and finding out if someone is in a gang. The Court thought these reasons were valid and reasonable, but they didn't say that people getting arrested have no privacy rights at all. Some Justices even hinted that there could be exceptions or changes to these rules in the future.
In another case, Maryland v. King, the Court said it's fine to take DNA samples from people charged with serious crimes to make sure they are correctly identified and to know about their criminal history and potential risks. They said that because getting a DNA sample is not a big invasion of privacy and because the need to identify people correctly is really important.
When it comes to searching prison cells, the Court said it's not limited by the usual rules about unreasonable searches. This means prison administrators can do surprise searches of inmate cells without having to follow strict rules, and inmates can only complain using the Eighth Amendment or state laws about harm or destruction.
For probationers, which are people who are allowed to live outside of jail but are monitored, their homes can be searched without a warrant if it's based on a valid rule that follows the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. This is because probation is a kind of punishment too, like being in jail, and strict rules might interfere with the way it's managed. Parolees, who are people released from prison under certain conditions, have even fewer privacy rights than probationers. So, if someone on parole agrees to certain conditions, like allowing searches, it's okay to search them without a warrant.
Workplace Searches:
Similar rules apply when a public employer wants to search its employees' workspaces like offices, desks, or file cabinets. But there's a difference when the search is done for law enforcement reasons. In a case called O’Connor v. Ortega, most of the Justices agreed, even though they had slightly different reasons, that a warrant or probable cause isn't needed for searches by employers when they're related to work or to investigating work-related wrongdoing. Four Justices thought each search should be looked at individually to see if it's reasonable, and one Justice believed that these searches don't break the Fourth Amendment at all.
In another case, City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court didn't decide exactly how much privacy a government employee should expect. Instead, they followed what they said in the O’Connor case about special needs. The Court found that even if there's a reasonable expectation of privacy, it was okay for a city to search a police officer's text messages made on city devices during work hours without a warrant. The Court said it was okay because the search was done for non-investigatory work reasons and it wasn't too invasive. A jury had said the search was to see if the city's contract with a wireless provider was okay, and the Court thought this was a reasonable way to find out if the officer's text messages were related to work or personal use.
Excluding Evidence
Exclusionary Rule and Evidence:
The Fourth Amendment states that people have the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, but it doesn't precisely define how this right should be enforced. Various ways of enforcing this right have been suggested, but only one, known as the exclusionary rule, has been consistently used by the Supreme Court. However, the Court has recently limited its application.
In theory, there are a few alternatives to the exclusionary rule. One option is to treat an illegal search and seizure as a criminal offense, leading to the prosecution of officers who engage in such behavior. However, instances of officers being criminally prosecuted for excessive law enforcement actions are extremely rare. Another option is internal disciplinary action within police departments, possibly overseen by police review boards in some places. Yet, examples of such disciplinary actions are quite uncommon as well.
Civil remedies are also available. Individuals who have been illegally arrested or had their privacy violated might have the option to bring a legal claim based on state laws or against the Federal Government through the Federal Tort Claims Act. Additionally, if police officers violate someone's Fourth Amendment rights while acting under state law, they can be sued in federal court for damages and other remedies under a civil rights statute. While this statute doesn't apply to federal officers, the Supreme Court has ruled that there is an implied right to damages for Fourth Amendment violations, which can be enforced in federal courts when injuries result from the violation.
However, implementing a damages remedy faces challenges. Law enforcement officers can use common-law defenses, with a significant one being the claim of acting in good faith. This defense isn't based on the officer's personal intentions but relies on qualified immunity. This means that officers are protected from liability if the search wasn't clearly against established Fourth Amendment law or if they reasonably believed that a warrantless search, later deemed unconstitutional, had probable cause or exigent circumstances. On a practical level, individuals who experience illegal arrests and seizures are often seen as disreputable by juries, or they might lack the means to pursue legal action due to financial constraints. Because of these challenges, the Court has emphasized that excluding unlawfully seized evidence from criminal trials is the most effective way to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
Adoption of Exclusionary Rule:
The origin of the exclusionary rule, which bars the use of evidence obtained through unlawful searches and seizures, traces back to Boyd v. United States. This case concerned a forced production of business papers, which the Court compared to a search and seizure. The Court also linked the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision with the Fourth Amendment's protections, forming a rule that excluded compelled evidence as it violated the defendant's self-incrimination rights. Despite initial limitations and the rejection of an exclusionary rule based on Fourth Amendment violations, the exclusionary rule emerged later in Weeks v. United States. This case involved evidence obtained from warrantless searches, and the Court unanimously determined that such evidence should have been excluded.
The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment imposes restrictions on law enforcement officers to ensure their actions are in line with constitutional guarantees. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent convictions based on unlawful searches and to discourage law enforcement from disregarding constitutional rights. This principle initially applied only to federal officers but later extended to state violations through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court established the exclusionary rule's constitutional basis, emphasizing its essential role in upholding the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the rule's application and effectiveness faced criticism. Some Justices expressed a desire to abolish or limit its scope, highlighting concerns about its deterrence value and potential impact on effective law enforcement.
Over time, the Court began to curtail the rule's application. Exceptions were introduced, such as allowing evidence obtained from co-conspirators or codefendants and using unlawfully seized evidence to impeach a defendant's testimony. The Court also introduced a "good faith" exception, permitting evidence obtained through officers' reasonable reliance on faulty warrants. This approach aimed to avoid penalizing officers for judicial errors and to balance the costs and benefits of the rule.
Recent cases, like United States v. Leon and Herring v. United States, have expanded the "good faith" exception. The Court upheld the admission of evidence when officers relied on defective warrants or made negligent mistakes, focusing on the balance between deterring police misconduct and maintaining a fair justice system. The Court's position on whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized without a warrant remains unclear, as does the future scope of the "good faith" exception.
In conclusion, the exclusionary rule emerged from cases like Weeks v. United States, designed to prevent the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in trials. While its application and scope have evolved, the rule continues to be a critical aspect of ensuring law enforcement respects individuals' Fourth Amendment rights.
Standing to Suppress Illegal Evidence:
The Court used to follow a rule called "standing" to determine if a person had the right to challenge the legality of evidence obtained from an allegedly illegal search. Similar to the idea that one can only contest government actions that harm them, this "standing" principle required someone to prove that they were personally affected by a privacy invasion if they wanted to challenge a search and suppress evidence. But later, the Court changed its approach, combining this "standing" question with the larger question of whether a person's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The Court found that this change didn't lead to different outcomes, and the focus should be on whether the search and seizure infringed on the defendant's interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" concept introduced by the Katz case largely replaced the idea of ownership that was previously used to determine if a person had the right to challenge a search or establish an invaded interest. In an older case, Jones v. United States, the Court said that someone who was on someone else's property as a guest could challenge a search. But later, in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court limited this by saying that a person must assert a personal interest protected by the Fourth Amendment to challenge a search. The Court clarified that ownership of seized items alone doesn't establish standing under the Katz principle. The new test, based on reasonable expectations of privacy, means that a person might have the right to Fourth Amendment protection even if their interest wasn't recognized as a property interest in the past. However, having a property or possessory interest in the place searched still matters when considering this issue.
Good Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule:
Another important limitation on the exclusionary rule involves the "attenuation exception," which allows evidence obtained through government misconduct to be used if the connection between that misconduct and the discovery of the evidence is considered distant enough or interrupted by intervening circumstances. The Court has used this exception in various cases to allow the admission of challenged evidence. For instance, in Wong Sun v. United States, the Court allowed the admission of a statement made by a defendant who was initially unlawfully arrested because the defendant was later lawfully arraigned, released, and then voluntarily returned to make the statement. Similarly, in Segura v. United States in 1984, the Court permitted evidence obtained after an illegal entry into a residence because the evidence was seized the following day based on a valid search warrant.
In a more recent case, Utah v. Strieff in 2016, the Court rejected a challenge to the admission of evidence obtained after an unlawful stop. The Court disagreed with the notion that the attenuation exception only applies when a defendant makes an independent decision. Instead, it considered three factors to decide whether the lawful acquisition of evidence was separate enough from the initial misconduct: the timing between the acts, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the nature of the official misconduct. The Court concluded that, overall, the circumstances favored admitting the evidence. While the proximity of the stop and the search suggested suppression, the presence of a valid arrest warrant strongly favored allowing the evidence, and there was no evidence of systematic police misconduct. The Court emphasized that the discovery of the warrant broke the link between the illegal stop and the evidence's discovery. This case appeared to establish a general rule that the existence of a valid warrant, unconnected to the stop, supports finding enough separation between the unlawful conduct and the evidence's discovery.
